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Criminal Theory in the
Twentieth Century
George P Fletcher*
The theoretical inquiry into the foundations of criminal law in the
twentieth century, in both civil and common law traditions, is assayed
by the consideration of seven main currents or trends. First, the
structure of offenses is examined in light of the bipartite, tripartite,
and quadripartite modes of analysis. Second, competing theories of
culpability - normative and descriptive - are weighed in connection
with their important ramifications for the presumption of proof and the
allocation of the burden of persuasion on defenses. Third, the struggle
with alternatives to punishment for the control and commitment of
dangerous but non-criminal persons is compared in civil and common
law approaches. Fourth, the ascendancy of feminism, as the most
successful interdisciplinary school of thought applied to criminal law
since the early 1970s, and its contributions in the areas of rape, self-
defense, provocation, and capital punishment are charted and weighed.
Fifth, one of the most distinctive facets of criminal theory in the last
century has been the emergence of the victims' rights movement; its
success is compared in civil and common law jurisdictions. Sixth,
while it is commonplace in the civil law tradition to embed issues of
criminal law within the principles of constitutional law, common law
jurisdictions vary; the increasing constitutionalization of criminal law
in Canada is contrasted with its decrease in the U.S. Seventh, against
the backdrop of a particularly intense period of codification of the
criminal law in the last half of the twentieth century, the celebrated
American Model Penal Code is criticized. Finally, four predictions for
the direction of criminal theory in the next century are ventured.
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
Theoretical Inquiries in Law
INTRODUCTION
When Kant, Blackstone, and Bentham wrote about law in the latter half
of the eighteenth century, they thought of law as a body of principles that
transcends the legislative authority of any particular society. Kant expressed
contempt for the study of positive law with his analogy between the raw
statements of legislative will and the empty wooden head of Phaedrus.'
Blackstone, too, thought of the common law as an enduring.body of principles
based on reason.
In the course of the nineteenth century, legal thought lost this insouciant
disregard for local rules and customs. As romantic music became German
or Czech or Hungarian, so too the law acquired different national identities.
The once-unified body of civil law, derived from Roman sources, became
codified in radically different codes in France and Germany. The grand
principles of the common law became positivized in the doctrine of stare
decisis: the local courts' decisions became the law, and despite some family
resemblances among English-speaking countries, the idea of the "same law"
applying across national borders lost its currency. Though we yearn for a
body of international law, even international criminal law, we are still very
much the children of the nineteenth-century movement toward localizing
the law in the framework of state authority.
Yet twentieth-century developments in criminal law differ significantly
from those of the nineteenth century. For the first time, serious scholars
became engaged by the structure of criminal offenses, by the nature of
action as a foundational element of liability, by the theory of justification
and excuse, and by the criteria for blameworthy, punishable conduct. To be
sure, the transition from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century
occurred gradually, without a sharp break at the turn of the century. There
are apodictic statements about actus reus and mens rea dating back to Sir
Edward Coke2 in the seventeenth century and Kant's analysis, in 1797, of the
shipwrecked sailors who kill to save their lives still repays careful reading.3
Yet the literature of the twentieth century represents a major breakthrough
toward a more systematic and philosophical study of the law that renders men
and women criminally accountable.
The two leading traditions in this literature have grouped themselves
I Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 55 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
2 Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Law of England 107 (1644)
("actus notfacit reus nisi mens sit rea," which may literally be translated as "the act
is not criminal unless the mind is criminal").
3 Kant, supra note 1, at 60.
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primarily around German and English sources. One line of thought, dating
back to Jeremy Bentham and even further still to the influential Italian critic
of capital punishment, Cesare Beccaria, stresses the deterrent function of
criminal law. All rules and doctrines of criminal law must be justified as
factors serving the goal of inducing law-abiding conduct in the future. This
line of thought is represented in the German literature by the works of Franz
von Liszt and his famous pupil Gustav Radbruch. The Bentham/von Liszt
line has been dominant in the pragmatic, get-the-job-done English-speaking
world. The other school of thought, stemming notably from Immanuel Kant
and G.F. Hegel, stresses the non-consequential duty to punish culpable
wrongdoing. Punishment is a non-consequential duty of justice, an end in
itself. A neo-Kantian movement (not always interested in a precise exegesis
of Kant's writings) made major inroads in the twentieth century, particularly
in the American philosophical literature. Among its strong supporters were
Herbert Morris, Robert Nozick, Michael Moore, Joel Feinberg, Sandy
Kadish, and, I suppose, myself.
The German literature captures the distinction between these two schools
by referring to the Kantians as standing for absolute theories of punishment
(punishment as a duty of justice) and the von Liszt school as promoting
relative theories of punishment - relative, that is, to a particular purpose.
The American literature makes the same distinction by referring to the
difference between the Kantians, on the one hand, and the Benthamites or
utilitarians, on the other.
The difference between the two schools is readily seen in the treatment of
excuses. The Kantians recognize excuses because they negate culpability,
and it is assumed to be unjust to punish someone who is not culpable or
blameworthy for his or her actions. The Benthamites rationalize the same
doctrinal conclusions in practice on the ground that excused actors are not
deterrable. It causes harm and does little good, therefore, to employ the
criminal sanction against non-deterrable actors.
H.L.A. Hart played a key role in mediating between these two schools of
thought. In distinguishing between the general aim of punishment and the
criteria of fair distribution, Hart provided a way of reconciling deterrence
as the aim of the system as a whole and nonconsequentialist concerns in
the fair imposition of punishment in the particular case. And his defense
of punishing inadvertent negligence as a form of mens rea or blameworthy
risk-taking remains of great significance.4 At the same time, however, leading
4 See the discussion of the Canadian developments at infra text accompanying notes
35-39.
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theoretical voices, notably Glanville Williams and Jerome Hall, thought that
punishing negligence is either wrong in principle or dubious as a partial
commitment to strict liability.5 Hart's sympathies were closer to Bentham
than to Kant, but nonetheless, on the basis of rigorous analysis, he concluded
that Bentham's deterrence-based theory of excuses represents a "spectacular
non-sequitur."6 Grounding excuses in the non-deterrability of excused action
presupposes, he pointed out, that the only potentially deterred actors are those
who are excused. Yet punishing insane or otherwise excused conduct does
have a deterrent effect on those who stand outside the narrow frame of those
"not-deterrable" because excused.
Hart also stood for the integration of analytic philosophy and legal
analysis. He was the first of many Anglo-American lawyers to analyze
substantive legal issues with the tools developed at Oxford and Cambridge
in the field of analytic and linguistic philosophy. Unfortunately, he was
among the last of the liberal political philosophers to show an abiding
interest in criminal law.
If we look across the Western world, a few basic themes stand out as
the major intellectual trends of the twentieth century. The following is
my attempt to group them into seven trends - five intellectual and two
institutional. Not all of these categories will be immediately obvious to
the common law reader, for some of the terms originate in the European
literature.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF OFFENSES
In the course of the twentieth century, the leading legal systems of the
world clarified and deepened their commitment to different systems for
organizing and analyzing the elements of offenses. The three basic systems
that have gained adherence fall into the neat categories of bipartite, tripartite,
and quadripartite modes of analysis. Using a system of two, three, or
four dimensions enables lawyers to think about specific offenses in the
offense-transcending manner that we call the "general part" of the criminal
law. For the convenience of exposition, we will consider first the bipartite,
second, the quadripartite, and finally the tripartite system.
5 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 262 (2d ed. 1961) (negligence
as a half-way house between mens rea and strict liability); Jerome Hall, Negligent
Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632 (1963).
6 H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in Punishment and
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 19 (1968).
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The simplest system is the bipartite system, with which we are familiar
in the English-speaking common law countries. This system distinguishes
between actus reus, or the external side of criminal conduct, and mens rea,
the internal side. The basic maxim of this system is that for every offense,
there must be a union of actus reus and mens rea. This principle was first
articulated by Sir Edward Coke, who inferred it from a few instances of
accepted law, one of them being that a would-be-thief who first acquired
possession and then formed the intent to steal is not guilty of theft.7 The
reason was that the intent occurred after, instead of concurrently with, the
relevant act of acquiring possession.
The American Model Penal Code ("MPC") has elaborated on this bipartite
system, distinguishing among four states of mens rea or, as the codifiers call
it, "culpability.' 8 For many, this represents an advance over the common law
and most European systems, which are content to distinguish between intent
and negligence as the two basic forms of mens rea.
The bipartite system, it is worth mentioning, is used in France and
Francophile countries, which distinguish in their literature between li' lment
materiale (=actus reus) and l'iliment morale (=mens rea). One of the
characteristics of this system is the reduction of the theory of mistake to
factors negating the required mens rea.9 For example, any mistake about
an element of an offense will negate intention; and a reasonable mistake will
negate negligence when negligence is sufficient for conviction. Confusion
remains about cases of mistake with regard to the factual circumstances of
justification (e.g., believing you are being attacked when you are not). For
example, the Model Penal Code purports to apply its required culpability
state analysis to all elements of an offense, including defensive issues of
justification and excuse, but it also contains specific rules governing mistaken
beliefs in the factual conditions of justification.' 0
Though the bipartite system of thought offers some conveniences, it has
one major drawback: it fails to provide a conceptual home for the entire
range of defenses that are grouped under the categories of justification
and excuse. All the defenses - from self-defense, to defense of property,
necessity, duress, insanity, diminished capacity, and intoxication - stand
outside the structure defined by actus reus and mens rea. If one tries to treat
one of these defenses, say the defense of duress, as a denial of intention,
7 Coke, supra note 2, at 107.
8 Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) (1962).
9 See id. § 2.04(1).
10 See, e.g., id. § 3.04.
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problems crop up in defining the acceptable limits of duress when the actor
feels coerced but nonetheless ought not submit to the external threat. If a
good faith feeling of coercion negates intention, then it will do so, even if
the threat is minor and a "person of reasonable firmness" would resist it."
The common law treats these defenses by distinguishing between the
case in chief and the claims of defense in confession and avoidance. This
accounts for the practice in common law countries of shifting the burden
of defense on some, if not all, of these defenses.' 2 The question whether the
presumption of innocence encompasses the denial of these defensive claims
is still hotly litigated in common law countries. 3
The bipartite mode of analysis reflects a private law model of analysis.
In tort and contract cases, we tend naturally to think of dividing the total
set of issues bearing on liability between the plaintiff and the defendant.
In virtually every known system of private law, the defendant must prove
self-defense. The extension of this model to the criminal law implies that
"defensive" material should fall to the charge of the defendant. Thinking
in the images of private law derives, in part, from the dominance of the
adversary system, a carry-over of procedural structures into the analysis of
the substantive law. This is hardly a sufficient explanation, however, for the
same system appeals to the French even though they are heirs not to the
adversary but to the Continental inquisitorial tradition.
The bipartite system enjoys some refinement in the quadripartite system,
which is a creature primarily of the Communist literature on criminal liability.
The quadripartite system neatly classifies elements into the following
categories: (1) the subject of the offense; (2) the subjective side of liability;
(3) the object of the offense; and (4) the objective side of liability. The
subjective and objective sides of the offense are the counterparts to mens
rea and actus reus, respectively.
The contribution of this system lies in the notions of subject and object
of the offense. The subject of the offense is the person who is addressed
by the criminai norm. Thus, there is a special category for analyzing the
problems of insanity and infancy, specifically, whether an immature or
mentally ill defendant should be subject to sanctions under the criminal law
as opposed to civil commitment or some other system of social control. With
a little imagination, one can bring other claims of excuse within the ambit
II This expression comes from the Model Penal Code definition of duress; id. § 2.09.
12 See, generally, George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study
of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L.J. 880 (1968).
13 For more on the presumption of innocence and the burden of persuasion, see infra
text accompanying notes 33-39.
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of this category of the person capable of committing a criminal offense.
Blackstone treated all excuses as questions pertaining to this extended sense
of the subject of the offense. This approach survives today in the statutes
following the Blackstonian model from the late nineteenth century. A good
example is Section 26 of the California Penal Code, which identifies a list
of exceptions to "the persons capable of committing a criminal offense."' 4
The notion of the "object" of the offense brings to bear a distinctively
Communist way of thinking about criminal offenses as directed in all cases
toward some social harm. The threatened harm, not necessarily mentioned
in the legal definition of the offense, is the "object" of the offense. This way
of thinking coincides with the liberal theory of John Stuart Mill that the
state may intervene to punish conduct only when it threatens to cause harm
to others. The Communist lawyers went further and posited that for conduct
to be "unlawful," it had to be "socially dangerous," that is, it had to threaten
a specific legally-protected interest such as life or property. The theory led
to the conclusion that if conduct is minimally threatening to others, it is to
be treated as a de minimis offense, with the indictment therefore subject to
dismissal.
Paradoxically, though there is a good deal of discussion of the theory
of unlawful conduct in the Communist literature, the quadripartite system
does not seem to recognize the dimension of wrongful or unlawful behavior.
Claims of justification, which negate the unlawfulness of the conduct, are
left outside the four categories, just as they are in the common law bipartite
system.
The major flaw common to both the bipartite and quadripartite systems
14 Cal. Penal Code § 26 (West 1999):
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the
following classes:
One - Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the
time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.
Two - Idiots.
Three - Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under
an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.
Four - Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.
Five - Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention,
or culpable negligence.
Six - Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed the
act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show
that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered
if they refused.
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is that they foster a naive psychology that distinguishes radically between
the internal forum of thought and the external arena of conduct. There is
no room to consider a monistic conception of thought and action, so long
as the system of analysis in the criminal law remains defiantly dualistic.
Whatever its flaws, this system persists in the Russian literature and, so
far as I know, in the former Communist countries. Zalman Feller, a law
professor of Romanian origin who later settled in Jerusalem, apparently
taught a generation of Israeli law students that this is the correct way of
structuring criminal liability.
The German tripartite system begins from premises entirely different
from the bipartite and quadripartite systems. The point of departure for
German theories, at least since the work of Karl Binding at the beginning
of the twentieth century, has been that the criminal offense must be treated
as a single entity. The inquiry focuses on a general "theory of crime"
(Verbrechenslehre) - a concept that remains a bit mysterious to some. The
point is that all the issues bearing on substantive liability must be ordered
under a set of rules defining what it means to commit, and to be liable
for, a crime. The consequence of this ordering is that the common law
division between the prosecution's and defense's cases disappears. To be
sure, nineteenth-century German criminal lawyers referred to "defenses"
(Einwdnde or Einwendungen) just as common lawyers do today. But when
the theoretical discussions took the step of ordering the entire offense under
a single "comprehensive" set of rules of liability - the usage of the terms
for "defense" disappeared from the language of German criminal lawyers.
The primary intellectual move necessary for the German tripartite system
was to bring the defensive claims of justification and excuse within a general
structure of three affirmative dimensions of liability: (1) the definition of the
offense (der Tatbestand in German; Tipo in Spanish); (2) wrongfulness or
unlawfulness; and (3) culpability or blameworthiness. Claims bearing on the
action, harm, and causation negate the definition of the offense. Claims of
justification negate wrongfulness, and claims of excuse negate culpability.
While it is fairly clear where most issues fall, there was considerable
debate in the post-war German literature about the proper classification
of intention and negligence. The traditional, harm-oriented school treated
these factors as bearing exclusively on culpability, which implied that
accidentally causing the death of another, without any culpability at all,
was still considered unlawful behavior. A more subjective school, calling
itself "finalist" or teleological, insisted that intention be treated as part of
the definition of the offense. This debate about the classification of issues
under the tripartite system became an impassioned confrontation among
[Vol. 2:265
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German scholars, with repercussions in the academic literature of many
other countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
Since that debate has run its course, German scholars have turned to other
questions that are more familiar to theoreticians in the Anglo-American
discussion. While the legal system has strong roots in the retributive
thinking of Kant and Hegel, post-war scholars have seemed to turn their
backs on these influences. Kant's views on punishment have turned out to
be more influential in the United States of the late twentieth century than
it has been in contemporary Germany. Some German scholars have argued
in the vein of Jeremy Bentham that the deterrent purposes of punishment
can explain the recognition of excusing conditions, thus dispensing with a
moral category of guilt or culpability. Others have followed GUnther Jakobs
in developing a functionalist theory of criminal law that dispenses, or
pretends to dispense, with any transcendental moral categories. 5 The debate
engendered by Jakobs' views has replicated the earlier confrontation between
Jurgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann about the existence of extra-societal
standards of judgment. The followers of Luhmann and Jakobs hold that all
questions of value are resolved internally, within the functionalist parameters
of a particular society.
These debates have had a major impact on the intellectual life of legal
scholars in many countries that see themselves as falling within the German
sphere of influence. The list includes Italy, Spain, Portugal, Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, Greece, and virtually all of Latin America. In all of these countries,
the German tripartite system is taken for granted.
II. THE NORMATIVE THEORY OF CULPABILITY
Let us pose a simple question: What intellectual move would be required to
move from the divided, proceduralist bipartite system to the comprehensive
tripartite system of German theory? To put the question another way, is
there a single idea that divides these various systems into different camps? I
think there is, and this idea is what we should call the normative as opposed
to the descriptive theory of culpability.
All the terms referring to mens rea (culpability, blameworthiness, guilty
mind, criminal intent, etc.) lend themselves either to a normative or to
a descriptive interpretation. The normative holds that these terms are
condemnatory and conclusive, in principle, on liability. The notion of
15 See Glnther Jakobs, Strafrecht: Ailgemeiner Teil (2d ed. 1991).
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culpability or mens rea must be 'interpreted, therefore, to be inconsistent
with the presence of a justification or an excuse. If someone acts properly
in necessity or self-defense or is excused on grounds of duress or insanity,
it cannot be the case, on the normative theory, that he or she is culpable.
On the descriptive interpretation of mens rea, however, it is entirely
possible that one might act with culpability (i.e., intention of knowledge)
and yet be justified or excused. As a descriptive matter, mens rea refers
simply to a state of consciousness, or to acting with a particular end in mind.
Having that end might be perfectly compatible with acting in self-defense
or under duress or even while insane.
There are signs of the normative theory having made inroads in common
law thinking. As early as 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Davis
that the notion of "guilt" should be interpreted in this normative sense:
The plea of not guilty is unlike a special plea in a civil action which,
admitting the case averred, seeks to establish substantive grounds of
defense by a preponderance of evidence. It is not in confession and
avoidance, for it is a plea that controverts the existence of every fact
essential to constitute the crime charged. Upon that plea the accused
may stand, shielded by the presumption of innocence, until it appears
that he is guilty; and his guilt cannot in the very nature of things
be regarded as proved, if the jury entertains a reasonable doubt from
all the evidence whether he was legally capable of committing the
crime. 16
If the reasoning of this opinion is carried to its logical conclusion, all the
issues of substantive law should be seen as bearing on the question of
culpability or guilt. That is what the Supreme Court meant in referring to
"every fact essential to constitute the crime charged."
Nonetheless, the normative theory has not established itself, to my regret,
in the thinking of common law jurisdictions. The Model Penal Code defines
"kinds of culpability" as purpose and knowledge as well as recklessness and
negligence. 17 That is, according to the MPC, the conduct might be culpable
in the sense of being purposeful or knowing and yet the action's moral or
normative culpability might be negated by a claim of self-defense, duress, or
insanity.
One implication of the normative theory is that if the prosecution must
prove mens rea or culpability beyond a reasonable doubt, then it must
16 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1895).
17 Model Penal Code § 2.02(2).
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disprove all defensive claims by the same measure of proof. The trend in all
common law countries is toward this position. The U.S. Supreme Court held
in Davis that this should be the rule with regard to issues of insanity, at least as
a matter of federal criminal law.'8 This movement toward a comprehensive
view of the presumption of innocence suggests a covert acceptance of the
thinking underlying the normative theory. Those who still favor the descriptive
theory have an easier time concluding that particular defensive claims, such as
insanity or self-defense, are extrinsic to the question of "guilt" and, therefore,
should not be covered by the presumption of innocence.
The normative theory, it should be noted, does not entail the distinction
between justification and excuse. Nor does accepting the latter distinction
entail the normative theory. These are independent theoretical developments,
but the far more important one - with more far-reaching consequences
for criminal law - is the normative theory of culpability now accepted as
self-evident in all of the countries in the German sphere of influence.
III. THE TWO-TRACK SYSTEM
Now let us return to the implications of the German tripartite system, which
can be restated as requiring three stages of analysis for each offense:
1) Definition;
2) Unlawfulness (wrongfulness); and
3) Culpability (mens rea, responsibility, blameworthiness, etc.).
Distinguishing between the questions of wrongful and of culpable conduct
enables criminal lawyers to identify conduct as wrongful (or unlawful) but
not culpable. The absence of culpability provides a sufficient reason for
acquittal. For example, Article 17 of the German Penal Code attaches the
consequence of "acting without culpability" to a finding that the defendant
labored under a reasonable (unavoidable) mistake of law. The implication is
that the defendant is to be acquitted ("no culpability" implies "no liability").
This category of acting "without culpability" includes all cases of conduct
excused on grounds of personal necessity, mistake of law, involuntary
intoxication, and insanity.
The way some American state courts use the verdict of "not guilty by
reason of insanity," the notion of "criminal but not culpable" has found a
place in common law thinking as well. "Not guilty by reason of insanity"
18 Davis, 160 U.S. 469.
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(NGI) presupposes that the actor is "guilty" of committing the unlawful act.
The claim of insanity negates merely the actor's culpability or responsibility.
The German system generalizes this practice to cover all cases of excused
conduct. They are treated as wrongful but not culpable.
After an NGI verdict, the trial court typically confines the acquitted
defendant to a mental institution on the grounds of his or her dangerousness.
The threshold for this finding of dangerousness is lower than in cases of
civil commitment without the prior finding of a criminal, unlawful act. 9 The
German "two-track system," now followed in many Continental countries,
represents a generalization of this basic idea.
The German Penal Code contains a whole range of provisions that the
judge might apply in cases of wrongful but excused conduct, provided that
the defendant is dangerous to others (whatever that means). This is called
the second track of "therapeutic and security measures."2° The common law
confinement of the defendant after an NGI verdict represents an exceptional
remedy of social protection. The two-track system has institutionalized this
exception into a systematic response to wrongful but excused conduct.
The institution of therapeutic and security measures first came into force
during the Nationalist Socialist period in Germany, and the German Penal
Code is still marred by a provision that permits the state to keep dangerous
offenders in prison even after they have served their prescribed terms.
21
Despite these dubious provisions that place public safety ahead of individual
rights, a broad coalition supports the therapeutic and security measures as
enlightened penal policy. The argument is sometimes that it is good to provide
therapeutic assistance to people who need it and sometimes that it is good
to take steps to protect society. Either way, the factors of wrongful conduct
and personal dangerousness combine to generate a distinct judicial power to
deprive individuals of their liberty.
This institution is now generally accepted in the Continental and Asian
countries under the German sphere of influence. The German response
to critics is that in fact, the common law also recognizes the second
track of civil commitment - e.g., after a verdict of NGI and in the
application of sexual predator laws 22 - but does so less forthrightly. The
apologist for the common law can reply that the common law attaches civil
19 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
20 See StGB §§ 61-72.
21 StGB § 66 (Sicherungsverwahrung).
22 Generally, American law limits the use of the distinct judicial power to cases in
which the defendant is not merely excused, but excused on grounds of mental illness.
But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding the power of the state
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commitment to dangerousness only in cases of mental illness, interpreted
broadly to include the situation of being a sexual predator. The German
practice is open and clearly regulated. The American style of civil commitment
remains exceptional, less visible, and basically outside the system of criminal
law.
Paradoxically, the standard European expressions for "criminal law"
include Strafrecht, derecho penal, diritto penale, etc. Yet all these labels
emphasize the punitive element in punishment. In fact, these systems that
employ the two-track system seek not to punish as the only response
to crime, but to offer a range of possible responses, some punitive and
some "therapeutic." The Continental systems would do better with the term
"criminal law," while the common law emphasis on punishment should
generate the label "penal law."
IV. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE
Let us now turn to some distinctive interdisciplinary contributions to criminal
law in the twentieth century. The disciplines that most influenced the law
in the early post war era were psychiatry and philosophy. These opposing
schools of thought, the first tending to downplay personal culpability and
the second tending to accentuate it, played a major part in the thinking
of American scholars in the 1950s and 1960s. The entire Yale school
of criminal law (including Abe Goldstein, Joe Goldstein, Jay Katz, and
Alan Dershowitz) was grounded in law and psychiatry. The call of the
philosophers came from Oxford, and the leader was undoubtedly H.L.A.
Hart, who worked in collaboration with John Austin, Philippa Foot, Herbert
Morris, and other analytic scholars.
In American academia as a whole, the three most influential schools
of thought since the early 1970s have been: law and economics, critical
legal studies, and feminism. As it turned out, however, the "econolawyers"
and the "crits" have had little to say about the old-fashioned issues of
guilt and punishment. From the vantage point of criminology and moral
philosophy, the economists made all the wrong assumptions. First, they
assumed that all sanctions were simply prices that offenders pay for engaging
in their chosen conduct. Philosophers have always stressed the expressive
to impose a term of detention after the defendant labeled a "sexual predator" had
served his prescribed term).
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and condemnatory nature of punishment,23 a factor that simply falls beyond
the economists' ken. Further, economists assumed that potential criminals
make rational calculations about whether committing a crime is worthy of
their time and trouble. This simple-minded view of criminal conduct could
only make criminologists smile. In the end, despite some good faith efforts,
those interested in the economic analysis of law have simply ignored the
complications of criminal justice.
The critical legal studies movement has fared no better. Except for
one article by Mark Kelman,24 the "crits" have had suprisingly little to say
about criminal justice. A leftist criminology was available for borrowing from
France and Germany, but this critique of crime as a product of capitalist society
never seemed to catch on in the United States.
The only academic movement of the 1970s and 1980s to have had
an impact on criminal law is feminism. With her taboo-shattering article,
Susan Estrich virtually exposed the entire field of rape law for critical
reassessment.25 Since then, numerous feminist critiques have focused on the
discriminatory treatment of women in substantive criminal law. The general
recognition in case law and legislation of a "battered women's defense" led
to sustained inquiry into the foundations of self-defense, particularly the
importance of the requirement that the defender be subject to an "imminent
risk" of attack. The defense of provocation has also received its share of
debunking criticism, the claim being that the cultural assumptions underlying
the defense favor men who kill women rather than women who kill men. The
feminist critique of criminal justice was surely long overdue - though there
may be dangers now of ideological excess.
2 6
Capital punishment is another field that poses the issue of identifying
sexist impulses in the criminal law. As typified in the O.J. Simpson case,
prosecutors rarely demand the death penalty when men kill their wives or
former wives. At the same time, the death penalty is rarely applied against
females convicted of brutal murderers - a pattern of discrimination against
men that is rarely noted. These are undoubtedly patterns of discrimination
in the law that require exposure and correction.
23 For example Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and
Deserving 95 (1974).
24 Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan.
L. Rev. 591, 598 (1981).
25 Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087 (1986).
26 For a superb survey and critique, see Ann Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L.
Rev. 1 (1994).
27 See my critique of a Soviet proposal (since accepted by Russian Duma) to exempt
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V. THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
One of the distinctive features of the current criminal law scene, in both
Continental Europe and the English-speaking world, is the emergence of
victims as an organized pressure group in criminal justice. Sometimes the
emphasis is on potential victims and sometimes on the concrete victim.
Of greater current interest is the concrete victim. With the rise of public
prosecution, victims have tended to lose their status and influence in the
criminal process. Continental systems still recognize the right of the victim to
compel prosecution, but the victim in the United States is totally dependent
on the prosecution's decision with respect to charging and plea-bargaining.
Admittedly, victims and their sentiments have come to play a major role
in sentencing in the United States. Victims are encouraged to speak at the
time of sentencing and to express their personal preferences about what
should happen to the convicted defendant.28 Since the victims usually are
interested in the defendant suffering as much as possible, this practice serves
the interests of prosecutors. But the sentiments of the particular victims seem
to me less important than the interests of the class of victims violated by the
particular offense. In the crime of homicide, for example, it should not matter
whether the decedent was a solitary old woman killed for her money or the
mother of three killed in a drive-by shooting.
Continental procedures, which are willing to recognize more than just
two parties at trial, have always been more victim-friendly than the common
law adversary system with its insistence that two, and only two, parties
litigate every dispute. Placing responsibility for the trial in the hands of an
inquisitorial-style judge frees up the system to include the victim as well as
the prosecution as parties in opposition to the defendant. The Continental
system is also more flexible in allowing joinder of the victim's tort claim to
the prosecution of the criminal offense.
It is not clear how far the victims' rights movement will go in the United
States. A proposed constitutional amendment to protect victims' right to be
present and to be heard at all proceedings has received substantial vocal
support from politicians who would see political advantage in their support
for victims' justice.
women from capital punishment. George P. Fletcher, On Trial in Gorbachev's
Courts, 36(8) N.Y. Rev. Books 13 (1989).
28 On the constitutionality of these procedures in capital cases, see Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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In Germany and, to some extent, in the English-speaking world, the
victims' rights movement has expressed itself in efforts to use mediation
to resolve the "conflict" between the offender and the victim. The German
system sees the use of mediation, at least for less serious offenses, as the
beginning of a third track - after punishment and therapeutic sanctions -
'for institutionalizing a response to criminal behavior.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
One of the distinguishing features of twentieth-century jurisprudence in
criminal law is the tendency to elevate the basic principles of criminal
responsibility to a constitutional level. Germany and Italy both regard the
principal of culpability - no liability without blameworthy execution of
an offense legislatively prohibited in advance - as a basic principle of
constitutional justice. In 1988, the Italian Constitutional Court ruled that
the provision in Italian Penal Code on mistake of law, which essentially
provided that mistakes of law should be irrelevant, was unconstitutional as
an over-inclusive rule permitting conviction of the morally innocent.19
Scholars have often urged similar developments under the due process
clause of the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court has never
taken more than a few tentative steps in the realm of substantive criminal
law without backtracking almost immediately. 30 In their first intervention,
the Justices in Washington struck down a California statute for supposedly
punishing the status of being a narcotics addict.3' The Court declared that due
process requires, at a minimum, that punishment be imposed for actions, not
for status. This sounds like a well-defined and limited principle, but in fact,
the concept of status is not so easily defined and lends itself to expansion
to include all forms of involuntary conduct. Public intoxication looks much
like narcotic addiction, but then so does kleptomania, prostitution, gambling,
racketeering, and involuntary sexual aggression. A few years after the initial
decision, a defendant convicted of public intoxication asserted that his crime
was a status offense because it was the product of addiction. The Court quickly
realized that it had trod into very uncertain territory. The public drunk lost his
29 Judgment of Italian Constitutional Court, Mar. 23, 1988, 31 Revista Italiana di
Diritto e Procedura Penale 686 (1988).
30 For a description of these efforts, see George P. Fletcher, The Meaning of Innocence,
48 U. Toronto L.J. 157 (1998).
31 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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case, and the Court seemed chagrined that it had dared to ponder the minimally
acceptable criteria of criminal responsibility. 32
The Justices fell into temptation once again when it seemed that they
should do something about state decisions to shift the burden of persuasion
on matters that the prosecution should properly prove. The problem was
figuring out whether the prosecution should bear responsibility for disproving
all issues that bear on guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The
primary areas of controversy were insanity, self-defense, provocation, and
extreme emotional disturbance in homicide cases. This line of cases ended in
a formalistic tragedy. The Court had already concluded that the prosecution
must disprove common law provocation beyond a reasonable doubt; the
question then became whether the same principle would govern the issue
of extreme emotional disturbance, which is in fact nothing more than the
Model Penal Code's version of provocation.33
A formal difference distinguishes common law provocation from extreme
emotional disturbance. The former negates malice, so that if one assumes
that the prosecution must prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt, it
follows logically that the prosecution must also disprove provocation by
the same degree of proof. The Model Penal Code abolished malice but
nonetheless recognizes "extreme emotional disturbance" as a ground for
mitigating murder into manslaughter. New York followed the structure laid
down by the MPC, which made "extreme emotional disturbance" appear
to be a free-standing affirmative defense, negating no particular element
in the prosecution's case. Accordingly, the State of New York thought it
permissible to require the defense to prove extreme emotional disturbance
by a preponderance of the evidence. In Patterson v. New York,34 the Court
concluded that this shift in the burden of proof was constitutionally acceptable.
The Court affirmed that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt "every ingredient in an offense." But the notion of "offense" did not
necessarily include independent factors in "confession and avoidance" that
negated no formal requirement of liability. Accordingly, if New York decided
that "extreme emotional disturbance" was a defense rather than the negation of
an element in the prosecution's case, there was no constitutional impediment
to shifting the onus of proof to the defense. The classifications of issues as
elements of the offense or as "defenses" was left, therefore, to the discretion of
32 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
33 See Model Penal Code § 210.3(b) (defining manslaughter as based on a finding of
extreme emotional disturbance).
34 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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state legislatures. Hence, a second chapter in the Court's intervention in state
criminal justice came to an abrupt end.
One of the reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court is reluctant to enter the
fray is that there is so much diversity in the substantive criminal law of the
fifty states that a morass of pitfalls awaits those who insist that there is only
one correct view of criminal responsibility under the Constitution. For the
sake of mastering its work load in other areas, particularly in the field of
criminal procedure, the Court is not likely ever to tangle with the issues- of
substantive criminal law.
The situation differs radically in Canada, where the nineteenth-
century Blackstonian Criminal Code applies nationwide, and the Canadian
Parliament has not succeeded in its efforts to enact a more modem code.
As a result, the coming into force, in 1982, of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms provided the Canadian Supreme Court with the authority
to undertake a systematic review of the substantive criminal law under
constitutional principles. The Court has no textual guide in the Charter
except the recognition of the "presumption of innocence" in Section 11(d)
and the very abstract principle of Section 7 requiring criminal law to conform
to "principles of fundamental justice."
The problem that has beset the Canadian Supreme Court has been
merging the process of common law development with the pursuit of basic
principles of criminal justice. It made sense as a matter of incremental,
case-by-case evolution to strike down laws of absolute liability by requiring
the defendant to bear the onus of proving due diligence or the absence of
negligence. After all, the defendant is better off after the change. Diachronic
thinking - comparing before and after - can justify a synchronic set
of principles as a process of improvement, but it cannot justify them as
claims of justice, supposedly binding regardless of their genesis. If the
presumption of innocence requires the prosecution to prove guilt or mens
rea beyond a reasonable doubt and if negligence negates mens rea, at least
as that concept is understood normatively, then the prosecution must also
disprove negligence or the absence of due diligence. The shift in the burden
of persuasion, therefore, stands in contradiction with the presumption of
innocence.35
The argument in favor of shifting the burden of proof is that the issue
of "due diligence" - the denial of negligence - falls outside the ambit of
guilt and innocence. But if due diligence does not bear on innocence, why
recognize the issue at all? If it is covered by the presumption of innocence,
35 See my analysis in Fletcher, supra note 30.
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then the prosecution must also disprove the claim of due diligence as it must
any other issue bearing on innocence.
It took several decades for the Canadian Justices to recognize their
mistake. Part of the problem was that the Court relied on the descriptive
theory of mens rea as developed by Glanville Williams36 and, therefore,
subscribed to the dogma that "real mens rea" requires subjective foresight of
the relative consequences. The turning point came in 1990, when Justices
Dickson and Lamer shifted in Martineau37 from the received wisdom,
namely, the descriptive theory, and adopted H.L.A. Hart's conception of
negligence.38 Admittedly, the Court in Martineau struck down the statutory
felony-murder rule equating an intent to cause grievous bodily harm with an
intent to kill. Yet, at the same time, the Court laid the intellectual groundwork
for accepting the culpability of negligence in the Creighton case four years
later.39 The jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court has now evolved
toward a more sophisticated jurisprudence of culpability and, for that reason
alone, deserves to be recognized as a leader in the field of criminal law in the
English-speaking world.
VII. CODIFICATION
The movement toward the revision of criminal codes and the enactment
of new ones was surely one of the major features of criminal justice in
the industrialized world in the closing decades of the twentieth century. In
the period from 1975 to 1995, German, France, Spain, Finland, Israel, and
Russia all adopted new codes of substantive criminal law. Also, beginning
in the 1960s, roughly thirty-five states in the United States adopted new
criminal codes following the basic structure and terminology of the Model
Penal Code. For a relatively short period of time, the legislative activity
during this period was one of the most intense in history.
1962 was a critical year in the process of recodifying criminal law in
the West. In that year the American Law Institute approved the "Proposed
Official Draft" of the Model Penal Code, and a Commission of German
scholars, working totally independently, approved a draft for the reform of
the 1871 German Criminal Code. The drafters of the MPC paid almost no
36 Williams, supra note 5, at 262.
37 R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
38 See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968), cited in Martineau, at 642.
39 R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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attention to the European experience in criminal law, and the Germans and
subsequent Continental drafters - with the exception of Israel - paid no
attention to the concepts, doctrines, and structure of the MPC. Developments
on the two sides of the Atlantic have, unfortunately, taken place without
reciprocal fertilization.
The drafting of the Rome Statute authorizing the International Criminal
Court, approved by 120 states in July 1998, did, however, bring together
common law ideas and at least some Continental principles. This experience
may portend greater emphasis on comparative legal studies in the future.
Most American observers of criminal law in the twentieth century would
underscore the importance of the MPC.4° Although the organizational and
political accomplishments of the MPC are undoubtedly impressive, I have my
doubts about the significance of the MPC as an intellectual and theoretical
achievement.4' Most of these doubts derive from the failure of the drafters at
the American Law Institute to pay attention to legal traditions other than their
own. The major defects of the MPC are as follows:
1. The MPC over-defines. The MPC provides definitions of action,42
causation, 43 and various mental states like purpose and negligence.' The
German Penal Code of 1975 defines none of these. It is by no means apparent
as to whether a criminal code should undertake to reduce these inherently
philosophical concepts to black letter rules. All of these definitions in the MPC
are, in fact, too complicated for ordinary lawyers and judges to understand
and to employ in practice. It is far better to leave the clarification of these
philosophical concepts to scholars who are eager to contribute their reflective
insights to the elaboration of the law.
2. The MPC rejects the history of the common law. The historical
development of crimes like larceny and embezzlement reflects considerable
thought and experience. The drafters arrogantly rejected all of this experience
for the sake of a unified crime of theft. Also, in the General Part defining
the criteria of justification, the Code ignores historical standards like the
40 See, e.g., Sanford Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
Cal. L. Rev. 943 (1999).
41 I have even greater doubts, I should add, about the Rome Statute defining the
International Criminal Court. I will publish this criticism in the next few years.
42 Model Penal Code § 2.01(2).
43 Id. § 2.03.
44 Id. § 2.03(2).
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imminence requirement for self-defense and necessity.45 It discards the word
"intent" for the sake of a new start with the term "purpose."
46
3. The MPC violates the rule of law. In punishing omissions, the MPC
permits the courts to develop duties of intervention on a case-by-case basis.
This practice, as the French have long recognized, is clearly inconsistent
with the principle that all offenses should be legislatively-defined prior to
their commission (nulla poena sine lege).47
4. The MPC has no coherent theory of crime or culpability. The
Code fails to take a clear stand on the issues that, viewed from a
comparative perspective, constitute the primary themes of twentieth-century
jurisprudence in criminal law. These include the normative theory of
culpability, the problem of a comprehensive theory of crime, and the
proper ordering of issues like insanity, mistake of law, entrapment, and
other controversial matters. The MPC treats these as part of a laundry
list of relevant questions, but its structure fails to reflect the relationship
between these claims and the basic principles of liability. It is no wonder
that many American legislators think they can abolish the insanity defense
or compromise mistake of law and entrapment without encroaching on basic
questions of justice to the defendant.
The lack of a coherent normative theory of culpability in the MPC permits
the Code to make the same mistake that we noted in the case law of the
Canadian Supreme Court. The drafters shifted the burden of persuasion in
certain cases where (like the Canadian Supreme Court) the Code makes the
diachronic judgment that the reform improves the situation of the defendant
who, therefore, has no reason to complain about bearing the burden of
persuasion.48
The worst feature of the MPC is its success, particularly in academic
circles. Too many teachers of criminal law take the MPC as the ideal
code, and they measure the rather pitiful doctrinal analysis in the opinions
published in the standard casebooks against this supposed ideal of clarity and
precision. As a result of this glorification of black letter rules in the MPC,
more speculative and critical inquiries about the foundations of criminal
justice flounder.
45 Id. §§ 3.02, 3.04.
46 Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
47 Id. § 2.01(3)(b) (liability for failure to perform any duty "imposed by law" where
the notion of "law" is not limited to statutory definition).
48 Id. § 2.03(4) (mistake of law); § 2.13(2) (entrapment).
20011
Theoretical Inquiries in Law
VIII. TOWARD THE NEXT CENTURY
Of the seven features of twentieth-century criminal law that I have
underscored, it is difficult to know which, if any, could have been predicted
a hundred years ago. Therefore, with some trepidation, I venture a few
guesses about the jurisprudence of criminal law in the twenty-first century.
First, I think we will have to deal with the problem of criminalizing the
use of drugs. At a theoretical level, that means we will have to rethink the
power of the state to use the criminal law as a teacher of proper moral
behavior. It also means that we will have to pay closer attention to the
efficacy of criminal law in reaching its objectives. Punishing the use of
drugs might well stand to the twenty-first century as the criminalization of
homosexuality stood to the twentieth century. We will not remain indifferent
to drug use as a health problem. I predict that when the intractability of the
problem becomes clear, we will conclude that decriminalization, coupled
with intensive advertising against the use of drugs, is a wiser policy than
relying on the criminal sanction.
Second, the international consensus against the death penalty will continue
to grow, with the resulting isolation of the United States, which is not likely
to heed world public opinion in this matter.
Third, the internationalization of criminal law will grow along with the
Internet and the consciousness of globalization. A hundred years from now,
the work of the International Criminal Court, soon to ratified by sixty
countries on the basis of the Rome Statute of 1998, will be at the very center
of our discipline.
Fourth, we will begin to think of criminal law as but one of many
disciplines that serve the basic values of securing public safety, declaring
our moral condemnation of evil conduct, and reintegrating the victim into
society. The American model of tort law - preferring a victim-controlled
private remedy to state-sponsored prosecution - will gain influence in the
world as a whole. There will be new techniques of social control, not yet
concrete or even conceived, that will challenge the sensibilities of criminal
lawyers to remain faithful to their task of finding the just balance between
the claims of the victim, the interests of society, and fairness to the suspect.
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